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1. Introduction  
The purpose of this article is to consider the case law on the requirement of standing to 
bring judicial review proceedings to challenge decisions made in the context of public 
procurement. There are suggestions in this case law that the approach to standing in 
such cases is narrower than that normally adopted in judicial review proceedings. It is 
the contention of this article that such suggestions should be firmly resisted. 
 
The extent to which the public procurement decisions of public authorities are amenable 
to judicial review is itself controversial.1 On the one hand, some argue that the rule of 
law requires that public law principles of rationality and fairness in principle apply in the 
ordinary way to all decisions made by public authorities, including contracting decisions. 
Contracting decisions should be amenable to judicial review provided a public law ground 
is raised.2 On the other, some argue that public authority contracting decisions should 
essentially be seen as governed by private law. The position is most closely contested 
where the unlawful act alleged comprises non-compliance with public procurement 
regulations that implement EU directives.3 Here, it has been suggested that, other than 
in very exceptional circumstances, the only persons who should be regarded as entitled 
to raise arguments based on such breaches are “economic operators” as defined in the 
                                         
1 See S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement: Regulation in the EU 
and UK (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd edn, 2014) pp 117-128. 
2 See S.H. Bailey, “Judicial review of contracting decisions” [2007] P.L.444, cited with 
approval by Kenneth Parker J. in R (on the application of A) v Chief Constable of B 
Constabulary [2012] EWHC 2141 (Admin). 
3 Eg the Public Contracts Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/5), replaced, with effect from 
February 26, 2015, by the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/102). 
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regulations.4 It is not intended here to revisit the amenability to judicial review debate 
directly. However, echoes of that debate can be discerned in cases on the (separate) 
issue of standing to bring a claim for judicial review, and it is this issue on which the 
present article is focused.  
 
It is well established in the modern case law on judicial review in England and Wales that 
a broad and flexible approach is to be adopted to the question of standing. The statutory 
test is whether the claimant “has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the 
application relates”.5 In R v Inland Revenue Commissioners Ex p National Federation of 
Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd6 the House of Lords by a majority7 held that the 
applicants did not have standing to seek judicial review of an “amnesty” in respect of tax 
evasion given by the IRC to Fleet Street casual workers. However, there was general 
agreement that an unduly restrictive approach to standing for a claim for judicial review 
should not be adopted8 and a decision9 that an applicant for mandamus had to show a 
specific legal right was expressly disapproved. The appropriateness of a broad rather 
than narrow approach was confirmed in subsequent case law in the High Court and the 
Court of Appeal.10 A range of factors may be relevant determining standing, including 
                                         
4 See the approach of Forbes J. in Chandler v Camden LBC; Chandler v Secretary of 
State for Children, Schools and Families [2009] EWHC 219 (Admin), disapproved by the 
Court of Appeal: R(on the application of Chandler) v  Secretary of State for Children, 
Schools and Families [2009] EWCA Civ 1011 but it would seem supported by counsel in 
argument in R (on the application of UNISON) v NHS Wiltshire Primary Care Trust [2012] 
EWHC 624 (Admin): see further n.74. The approach to standing of the Court of Appeal in 
Chandler, while not as restrictive as Forbes J., can be interpreted as narrower than the 
normal approach in judicial review cases and is criticised on that basis below: see Part 6.   
5 Senior Courts Act 1981 s.31(3). 
6 [1982] A.C.617. 
7 Lords Wilberforce, Fraser and Roskill. Lords Diplock and Scarman held that the 
applicants would have had standing had the arrangement been ultra vires. 
8 See, with varying degrees of emphasis, Lord Fraser at 645-646, Lord Scarman at 653, 
Lord Roskill at 656, 658, and Lord Diplock at 559. 
9 R v Lewisham Union Guardians [1897] 1 Q.B.488. 
10 Lord Woolf et al, De Smith’s Judicial Review (London:  Sweet & Maxwell, 7th edn., 
2013) pp. 77-86.  See eg R v Secretary of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex p World 
Development Movement [1995] 1 W.L.R. 386 (WDM, none of whose members were 
direct affected, accorded standing to challenge grant of overseas aid to government of 
Malaysia); R v Somerset CC ex p Dixon [1997] C.O.D. 323 (individual who was local 
resident, parish councillor and member of environmental bodies accorded standing in 
respect of challenge to planning permission for quarry extension). 
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the legislative framework, the strength and importance of the grounds of challenge, the 
impact of the decision on the claimant’s interests,11 the public interest and the presence 
or absence of other challengers.12 Because of the complexity of the matters to be 
considered it is unusual for permission to apply for judicial review to be refused solely by 
reference to lack of standing,13 and normal for standing to be considered at the hearing 
stage14 alongside the substantive grounds. It is, furthermore, unusual for a court to find 
that substantive grounds are made out but a remedy is refused solely on the ground of 
lack of standing.15  
 
This broad approach has also now received the endorsement of the Supreme Court in 
two appeals from Scotland.16 However, there have also been suggestions in some 
quarters that a narrow approach to standing is generally appropriate in the specific 
context of public procurement.17 It will be contended in this article that such an 
approach, treating public procurement judicial reviews as a discrete subset of judicial 
review cases, would in principle be undesirable, for two reasons. First, it would add as an 
issue for litigation the complication of how to identify the subset of cases where the 
special rules would apply; secondly, it would undermine the rule of law in narrowing the 
circumstances in which unlawful action could successfully be challenged. 
 
                                         
11 De Smith op.cit n.10 para.2-030 notes that “If a decision interferes directly with the 
claimant’s personal or public rights or has adverse financial consequences for him then 
this will be an obvious case in which he will have standing. But as the Court of Appeal 
has made plain, the relevance of the claimant’s personal rights is not that without them 
there would be no claim for judicial review” 
12 De Smith op.cit n.10 paras 2-026-2-034. 
13 De Smith op.cit n.10 para.2-017. In the National Federation case, the House of Lords 
held that, except in an obvious case, standing ought not to be dealt with as a preliminary 
issue at the permission stage: ibid. 
14 This may be a “rolled-up” hearing covering both the permission application and the full 
hearing of the claim: De Smith op.cit n.10 para.16-075. 
15 De Smith op.cit n.10 para.2-020. 
16 See Parts 4 and 5 below. 
17 See Parts 6 and 7 below. 
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A useful starting point for consideration of these matters is the recent decision of the 
High Court in R (on the application of Gottlieb) v Winchester City Council,18 a public 
procurement judicial review case.  
 
2. The decision in Gottlieb 
In R (on the application of Gottlieb) v Winchester City Council 19 the claimant, Kim 
Gottlieb, applied for judicial review of the decision of Winchester City Council to 
authorise variations to a contract with a developer (the “development agreements”) to 
build a new mixed retail, residential and transport centre in the “Silver Hill” area of 
Winchester city centre.  Lang J. held that the variations (to remove affordable housing 
and civic amenities) were material and, accordingly, that the decision to authorise them, 
without carrying out a procurement process as required by Directive 2004/18/EC and the 
Public Contracts Regulations 2006,20 was unlawful. This aspect of the case is the subject 
of a separate comment in this journal.21 
 
The present article concerns the issue of the claimant’s standing to bring judicial review 
proceedings.  The claimant was a resident of Winchester, a chartered surveyor and a 
director of a small private property investment and development company.  He had been 
an elected councillor of Winchester City Council for the Itchen Valley Ward since May 
201122 and a member of the council’s Silver Hill Reference Group.  He was also a leading 
member of the Winchester Deserves Better Campaign, which opposed the scheme.  He 
regarded the scheme as varied as being poorly designed and was concerned that 
affordable housing and civic amenities had been removed. 
 
                                         
18 [2015] EWHC 231 (Admin). 
19 [2015] EWHC 231 (Admin). 
20 SI 2006/5. 
21 See [2015] P.P.L.R. NA 81. 
22 Councillor Gottlieb is a Conservative Councillor and was re-elected on May 7, 2015.  
Winchester City Council was formerly a minority Conservative administration and after 




Lang J. declined an invitation by the defendants for her to exercise her discretion not to 
quash the decision, this being a “serious breach of the procurement regime, which is 
both substantive and procedural in nature”.   She noted that this was the second occasion 
on which the council had committed such a breach in the lifetime of one contract23 and 
that it would be an exceptional course to allow the council’s unlawful decision to stand.24 
 
The council also argued that “the claimant (a non-economic operator) has no interest in 
the observance of the public procurement regime)”.  Lang J. rejected this argument, 
noting that the claimant “in his capacity as a resident, council tax payer, and City 
Councillor,” had a legitimate interest in seeking to ensure that the council complied with 
the law, spent public money wisely and secured through open competition the most 
appropriate development for Winchester.  He had been closely involved in the 
consideration of the scheme as a councillor and campaigner.  His standing had not been 
disputed at the permission stage.  It was clear that standing was not confined to those 
with a direct financial or legal interest25 or to economic operators.26  The claim was 
distinguishable on the facts from R (on the application of Chandler) v Secretary of State 
for Children, Schools and Families27 where it was held that the claimant in that case 
lacked standing for a claim that a decision to establish an academy school was unlawful 
for non-compliance with the procurement regime.  The ground for denying standing was 
that she was motivated by her political opposition to academies rather than any interest 
in the observance of the public procurement regime.  This was distinguishable here as 
                                         
23 Entry to the original contract had not complied with the procurement regime then 
applicable, the council acting in reliance on mistaken legal advice.  However, it was too 
late to challenge the lawfulness of the development agreement on that basis:  [2015] 
EWHC 231 (Admin), para.[50]. 
24 [2015] EWHC 231 (Admin) at para.[145]. 
25 R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p National Federation of Self-Employed and 
Small Businesses Ltd [1982] A.C.617, 694B-C. 
26 R (on the application of The Law Society) v Legal Services Commission [2007] EWCA 
Civ 1264, [2008] Q.B. 737 See P. Henty, [2008] P.P.L.R. NA 108. 
27 [2009] EWCA Civ 1011, [2010] B.L.G.R.  1. See P. Henty, [2010] P.P.L.R. NA 64 and 
S.H. Bailey, [2010] P.P.L.R. NA 68. 
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the claimant was seeking what the public procurement process was intended to provide.  
He had no ulterior motive.28 
 
 
3. Comments on the ruling on standing in Gottlieb 
It is submitted, with respect, that Lang J.’s decision on the standing point is entirely 
consistent with the modern authorities on standing for judicial review (which are 
considered below) and is clearly right.  It is unsurprising that the point was not raised at 
the permission stage and the fact that it was raised at the hearing could be seen as 
optimistic.  The argument perhaps reflects a continued feeling in some quarters that 
litigation arising from the public procurement regime should be seen simply as a private 
matter for economic operators, and is no business of anyone else’s.  It may also reflect a 
hope (possibly engendered by the Chandler decision itself) that the position of a claimant 
as a campaigner against major public projects might itself be looked upon with disfavour 
in assessing standing.  Such a development would certainly happen to chime in with 
statements by the Prime Minister and the then Justice Secretary seeking to justify the 
introduction of a variety of restrictions on access to judicial review.29 
 
4. Modern authorities on standing for judicial review: AXA and Walton  
The leading modern authorities on standing in public law are two decisions of the 
Supreme Court in appeals from Scotland:  AXA General Insurance Ltd v H M Advocate30 
                                         
28 [2015] EWHC 231 (Admin) paras [151] - [153]. 
29 Mr Cameron in a speech to the CBI on 19 November 2012: “… judicial reviews.  This is 
a massive growth industry in Britain today … [S]ome are well founded …. [B]ut so many 
are completely pointless.  We urgently need to get a grip on this” 
(www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-to-cbi, accessed 9 March 
2015.  Mr Grayling justified changes to judicial review by arguing, inter alia:  “The 
judicial review system is an important way to right wrongs, but it is not a promotional 
tool for countless Left-wing campaigners”:  Daily Mail, 6 September 2013 
www.dailymail.co.uk (accessed 9 March 2015).  As to the restrictions that have been 
introduced, see below. 
30 [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 A.C.868. 
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and Walton v Scottish Ministers,31 the latter drawing on the former. These cases are 
regarded as authoritative in England and Wales in respect of both whether a person has 
a sufficient interest to apply for judicial review and whether a person is a “person 
aggrieved” for the purposes of a statutory application to quash,32 issues on which the 
courts today generally adopt similar approaches. 
 
In Axa, insurers whose business included writing employers’ liability insurance policies 
challenged the Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) (Scotland) Act 200933 on the 
ground that it was outside the legislative competence  of the Scottish Parliament, as 
being incompatible with a Convention right34 and irrational. These challenges were 
rejected on the merits. One issue was whether eight individuals who had developed 
pleural plaques could be joined as parties under rule 58.8(2) of the Court of Session 
Rules35 to resist the insurers’ claim. This provided that any person “who is directly 
affected by any issue raised” could apply to be joined as a party. The Inner House of the 
Court of Session held that a person could only be joined as party under this rule if they 
had “title and interest”, which was also the test for entitlement to bring an application 
for judicial review.36 The Supreme Court37 agreed that the same test should be applied in 
determining these two matters, but reversed the Inner House on the nature of the test 
that was to be applied. Lord Hope said that, as these proceedings lay within the sphere 
of public law, it was not appropriate to apply the narrow test of whether the applicants 
had “title and interest” to bring the proceedings, this test only being appropriate to 
                                         
31 [2012] UKSC 44.  See Baroness Hale, “Who guards the guardians” [2014] J.R.1; 
J.N.E. Varuhas, [2013] C.L.J. 243; C.T. Reid, “The end of the road for Walton” 2013 Jur. 
Rev. 53; D. Elvin, [2012] J.R. 287. 
32 See n.64 below. 
33 This Act was passed to reverse (with retrospective effect) case-law that established 
that asymptomatic pleural plaques did not constitute an injury that could give rise to a 
claim for damages. 
34 First Protocol, art.1 (right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions). 
35 This provided that any person “who is directly affected by any issue raised” could 
apply to be joined as a party. 
36 See 2011 S.L.T. 436 at paras 54-57. 
37 The leading opinions were given by Lords Hope and Reed, who agreed with each 
other. Lords Kerr, Clarke and Dyson agreed (at para.[177]) with both opinions; Lords 
Brown and Mance (paras [84], [85]) agreed with the views of Lords Hope and Reed on 
(inter alia) the issue of standing.  
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private law proceedings.38 In proceedings concerning public law, the question should be 
whether the applicant had “standing” rather than “title and interest”. A person could 
have a “sufficient interest” for these purposes even though they could not demonstrate 
that they had “title” to do so. Lord Hope also expressly agreed with Lord Reed’s view39 
that standing has to be based on the concept of interests and not the concept of rights.40 
On the test for standing, Lord Hope said the following:41 
“Like Lord Dunedin in D & J Nicol v Dundee Harbour Trustees, I would not like to 
risk a definition of what constitutes standing in the public law context. But I 
would hold that the words ‘directly affected’ which appear in r 58.8(2) capture the 
essence of what is to be looked for. One must, of course, distinguish between the 
mere busybody … and the interest of the person affected by or having a 
reasonable concern in the matter to which the application related. The inclusion of 
the word ‘directly’ provides the necessary qualification to the word ‘affected’ to 
enable the court to draw that distinction. A personal interest need not be shown if 
the individual is acting in the public interest and can genuinely say that the issue 
directly affects the section of the public that he seeks to represent.” 
It was “plain” that the eight individuals were “directly affected”. 42 
 
This passage is not wholly free from difficulty. The difficulty arises from the fact that the 
Court wishes to apply the same test for standing for applicants and other parties (in 
effect “sufficient interest”) whereas the statutory test to be joined as a party includes the 
words “directly affected”. It is submitted that the most natural interpretation is that any 
                                         
38 See Lord Dunedin in Dundee Harbour Trustees v D & J Nicol [1915] A.C.550, 561-562: 
His Lordship said that, while not defining when a person had title to sue, for a person to 
have such title “he must be party (using the word in its widest sense) to some legal 
relation which gives him some right which the person against whom he raises the action 
either infringes or denies”. De Smith n.10 para.2-072 notes that on this approach a 
respondent may enter pleas of ‘no title to sue’ (by reference to Lord Dunedin’s words) 
and “‘no interest to sue’ (there must be some real rather than merely an academic 
question of law)” although these elements sometimes ran into each other.  
39 [2011] UKSC 46 at para.[170]. 
40 [2011] UKSC 46 at para.[62]. 
41 Lord Hope, para.[63]; cited by Lord Reed in Walton at para.[91]. 
42 Lord Hope, para.[64]. 
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person with a “sufficient interest,” applying normal judicial review principles, is to be 
regarded as “directly affected” for the purposes of being joined as a party in public law 
proceedings. A less persuasive interpretation would be that, for a “sufficient interest,” 
either the applicant, or the section of the public the applicant seeks to represent, must 
be “directly affected”, bringing that in as an express general requirement. A literal 
interpretation of Lord Hope’s wording could support that position. However, the clear 
purpose of the Court was to liberalise standing rules in Scotland and put them on the 
same footing as the position in England and Wales. In that jurisdiction, being “directly 
affected” is not a general requirement for standing to bring a claim for judicial review but 
is for a person to participate as an “interested party” to judicial review proceedings.43 
Accordingly, it is submitted that a literal interpretation should not be adopted. Indeed, in 
Walton, Lord Reed characterised Axa as involving disapproval by the Supreme Court of a 
restrictive approach previously adopted in Scotland in public law cases “which 
presupposed that the only function of the court’s supervisory jurisdiction was to redress 
individual grievances, and ignored its constitutional function of maintaining the rule of 
law”.44 
 
Walton itself concerned a statutory challenge to schemes and orders made by the 
Scottish Ministers under the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984 concerning the construction of a 
new road network (the “Western Peripheral Route”) around Aberdeen. The challenge was 
brought under the 1984 Act Sch.2 para.2, which provides that if any “person aggrieved” 
by an order under the Act desires to question its validity on the grounds that it is not 
within the powers of the Act or that any requirement of the Act has not been complied 
with in relation to the order, he may, within six weeks make an application as regards 
that validity to the Court of Session.45 If the court is satisfied that the order is not within 
                                         
43 CPR Rule 54.1(2)(f). 
44 [2012] UKSC 44, para.[90]. 
45 There are many examples of similar provisions on the statute book in both England 
and Wales and in Scotland. The grounds are regarded as analogous to the common law 
grounds for judicial review: see De Smith op.cit n.10 para.17-029; H.W.R. Wade and 
C.F.Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford: OUP, 11th edn., 2014), pp 625-626. The main 
10 
 
the powers of the Act or that the interests of the applicant have been substantially 
prejudiced by failure to comply with any such requirement, it has a discretion to quash 
the order, either generally or in so far as it affects the property of the applicant.46 An 
order may not otherwise be challenged.47 
 
Mr Walton was the chairman of Road Sense, a local organisation opposed to the WPR.  
The grounds were non-compliance with, first, the Strategic Environmental Assessment 
Directive48 and, secondly, the common law requirements of fairness.  The substantive 
grounds were rejected, but there was an extended discussion of Mr Walton’s standing, 
the Inner House49 having held that he was not a “person aggrieved” for the purpose of 
bringing the statutory challenge.50  The leading opinion was that of Lord Reed, with 
whom all the other members of the Supreme Court agreed.  His Lordship considered, 
first, whether Mr Walton was a “person aggrieved” and, secondly, whether he would 
have standing to invoke the court’s supervisory jurisdiction (the Scottish equivalent of 
judicial review in England and Wales).  On the first point, he noted that, both in Scotland 
and in England and Wales, “persons will ordinarily be regarded as aggrieved if they made 
objections or representations as part of the procedure which preceded the decision 
challenged, and their complaint is that the decision was not properly made”.51  
Furthermore, there were circumstances where a person who had not so participated 
might nevertheless be a “person aggrieved”, as, for example, where an inadequate 
description of the development in the application and advertisement concerning the 
scheme could have misled him or her so that he or she did not object or take part in the 
inquiry.  Ordinarily, however, it would be relevant to consider whether the applicant had 
stated his or her objection at the appropriate stage of the statutory procedure, since it 
                                                                                                                               
purpose of such provisions is to make a statutory application to quash brought within six 
weeks the exclusive remedy. 
46 1984 Act Sch.2 para 3.  
47 1984 Act Sch.2 para 4. 
48 Dir. 2001/42/EC. 
49 [2012] CSIH 19. 
50 1984 Act Sch.2 para.2. 
51 [2012] UKSC 44, para.[86]. 
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was designed to allow objections to be made and a decision reached within a reasonable 
time as intended by Parliament.52  Mr Walton had participated in the local inquiry and 
was not “a mere busybody interfering in things which do not concern him”.  He resided 
in the vicinity of the western leg of the WPR, was an active member of local 
organisations concerned with the environment and chairman of the local organisation 
formed specifically to oppose the WPR on environmental grounds.  He had demonstrated 
a genuine concern about what he contended was an illegality in the grant of consent for 
a development that was bound to have a significant impact on the natural environment.  
He was “indubitably” a person aggrieved.53 
 
The Inner House had also stated that Mr Walton would have lacked standing even if the 
test were the same as would apply to an application to the supervisory jurisdiction.  That 
view was rejected too.54  On this point, Lord Reed referred to the views expressed by 
himself and Lord Hope in Axa.55 The Inner House in Walton had held56 that Mr Walton did 
not have a sufficient interest, his residence being some significant distance from the leg 
of the proposal particularly attacked.  Lord Reed indicated57 that the key distinction lay 
between the “mere busybody” from the “person affected by or having a reasonable 
concern” in the matter in question: 
“A busybody is someone who interferes in something with which he has no 
legitimate concern.  The circumstances which justify the conclusion that a person 
is affected by the matter to which an application relates, or has a reasonable 
concern in it, or is on the other hand interfering in a matter with which he has no 
legitimate concern, will plainly differ from one case to another, depending upon 
the particular context and the grounds of the application.” 
                                         
52 [2012] UKSC 44, para.[87]. 
53 [2012] UKSC 44, para.[88]. 
54 [2012] UKSC 44, paras[89]–[96]. 
55 See above. 
56 [2011] CSIH 19, at paras[36]–[38], citing Lord Hope and Lord Reed in Axa, including 
the former’s reference to the need for the claimant to be “directly affected”. 
57 [2012] UKSC 44 para.[92]. He repeated Lord Hope’s point from Axa that the “directly 




Lord Reed also emphasised the point that what constitutes sufficient interest “has to be 
considered in the context of the issues raised”. In some contexts, it would be appropriate 
to require the applicant “to demonstrate that he has a particular interest in the matter 
complained of”, the type of interest required depending on the context.  In other 
situations, as where the excess or misuse of power affected the public generally, 
insistence on a particular interest could prevent the matter being brought before the 
court, and that might disable the court from performing its function to protect the rule of 
law.58   Accordingly, while in many contexts, the person must demonstrate a “particular 
interest” there may also be cases where any individuals simply as a citizen will have a 
sufficient interest, without having to demonstrate any greater impact upon him – or 
herself than upon other members of the public: “The rule of law would not be maintained 
if, because everyone was equally affected by an unlawful act, no-one was able to bring 
proceedings to challenge it.”59 
 
Finally, Lord Reed noted60  that the interest of the applicant was not merely a threshold 
issue, but might bear upon the court’s discretion whether to grant a remedy.61  On the 
facts, the same factors as made Mr Walton a “person aggrieved” would have given him 
standing for an application to the supervisory jurisdiction.  
 
Lord Hope made similar observations to those of Lord Reed, emphasising that some 
environmental issues could properly be raised by an applicant even though he or she 
was not personally affected in his or her private interest; indeed environmental law 
                                         
58 [2012] UKSC 44, para.[93], citing his own opinion in Axa at para.[170]. 
59 [2012] UKSC 44, para.[94]. 
60 [2012] UKSC 44, para.[95], agreeing with observations by Lord Carnwath at 
para.[103].  Here Lord Carnwath said he saw discretion “to some extent as a necessary 
counterbalance to the widening of rules of standing”. 
61 An important dimension of the decision in Walton was the (obiter) holding that the 
court retained a discretion not to quash an order, even where there was a breach of 
directly effective EU law:  see Lord Carnwath at paras[115] – [140].  For criticism that 
this view is wrong, see R. McCracken and D. Edwards, “Standing and discretion in 
environmental challenges; Walton, a curate’s egg” [2014] J.P.L. 304. 
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“proceeds on the basis that the quality of the natural environment is of legitimate 
concern to everyone.  The osprey has no means of taking that step on its own behalf, 
any more than any other wild creature.  If its interests are to be protected someone has 
to be allowed to speak up on its behalf”.62 However, individuals here would need to 
demonstrate that they had a genuine interest in the aspects of the environment they 
sought to protect and that they had “sufficient knowledge of the subject to qualify them 
to act in the public interest in what is, in essence, a representative capacity.” 
 
It will be noted that neither Lord Hope nor Lord Reed suggest that there is any 
significant difference between the “person aggrieved” test applicable to statutory 
applications to quash and the “sufficient  interest” test applicable to judicial review.63   
 
5. The reception of Walton 
The observations in Walton have been treated as authoritative within England and 
Wales.64  They are certainly generally consistent with the flexible, and relatively liberal, 
approach to standing to be found in cases on standing from that jurisdiction.65 
 
There is left, however, some uncertainty about the continuing significance of the concept 
of the expression “directly affected”, although there is clear confirmation that standing to 
                                         
62 [2012] UKSC 44, para.[152]. 
63 While there are some inconsistencies in the application of the “person aggrieved” test, 
some perhaps to be explained by the different statutory contexts in which the expression 
is used, De Smith, op. cit. n.10 para. 2-061 notes that “in accord with the developments 
which were taking place on applications for judicial review, there has been a clearly 
discernible trend way from the restrictive and highly technical approach to who is a 
person aggrieved” formerly adopted. Modern cases adopting a broad approach include 
Cook v Southend BC [1990] 2 Q.B.1; Morbaine v First Secretary of State [2004] EWHC 
1708.   
 64 The observations on the meaning of “person aggrieved” were applied in Mackman v 
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2013] EWHC 3396 (Admin), 
paras[16]–[22] and JB Trustees Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government [2013] EWHC 3555 (Admin).  Observations relevant to standing for judicial 
review were applied in Greaves v Boston BC [2014] EWHC 3950 (Admin) (standing to 
challenge planning permission for wind turbine lost when claimant moved house) and in 
R (on the application of O) v Secretary of State for International Development [2014] 
EWHC 2371 (QB). 
65 See above n.10. 
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bring proceedings for judicial review is not invariably to be confined to those whose 
personal interests are affected.66 It is possible that the difficulty really stems from the 
assumption of the Supreme Court in Axa that the test of standing to be an applicant for 
judicial review is the same as the test for being a party (or in England and Wales an 
“interested party” under CPR Rule 54). There is clear English authority that the latter 
test, also requiring a person to be “directly affected,” is narrower that the former.67 It is 
not obvious why the position should be any different in Scotland. 
 
A further uncertainty relates to the importance of “context”. It is submitted that the 
context to be considered is the context of the particular litigation, including the issues 
raised.  It is difficult to see Walton as authority for the proposition that there are some 
general “contexts” (such as public procurement) where a narrow approach to standing is 
to be adopted as a matter of course in all cases, irrespective of the issues raised. 
 
6. Standing in public procurement judicial reviews: Chandler 
                                         
66 See the view of the Inner House in McGinty v Scottish Ministers [2013] CSIH 78, 
[2014] S.C. 81 at para.[48]:  “We consider there is force in [counsel’s] observation that 
what is left unresolved in [Axa] and Walton is exactly how one should go about 
distinguishing between [the mere busybody] … and the individual who has the genuine 
interest sufficient to be accorded standing… to challenge a decision with environmental 
consequences which do not impact on that individual’s private interest.”  The court 
accorded standing “at least at this stage” to a keen bird-watcher concerned to see 
mudflats preserved as a habitat for birds and concerned about the harmful effects of 
carbon dioxide emissions, in the context of designation of a major power station and 
transhipment hub project in Scotland’s National Planning Framework.  The claim was 
dismissed on the merits. In a subsequent case, the “directly affected” test has been 
applied narrowly in Scotland in holding that interest groups applying for judicial review 
did not have standing: see Lord Pentland in the Outer House of the Court of Session in 
In the Petition of (First) the Christian Institute;  (second) Family Education Trust; (third) 
The Young Me Sufferers (“Tymes”) trust;  (fourth) Care (Christian Action Research and 
Education);  (fifth) and (sixth) James & Rhianwen Mcintosh; and (seventh) Deborah 
Thomas Petitioners; for Judicial Review of the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 
2014 [2015] CSOH 7, criticised by B. Christman, ‘An Unholy Resurrection in the Court of 
Session’ UK Const. L. Blog (18th Mar 2015) (available at 
http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/)).   
67 R (on the application of Williams) v Legal Services Commission [2004] EWHC 163; cf R 
v Rent Officer Service, ex p Muldoon [1996] 3 All E.R. 498. In Williams, McCombe J. held 
that a drug company was not “directly affected” by the result of proceedings for judicial 
review of the LSC’s decision to end funding for civil proceedings against this (and other) 
drug companies claiming that the MMR vaccine had caused the claimants serous 
disabilities; while the drug company might have had standing to seek judicial review of 
the grant of public funding, the test here was narrower. 
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It may be, however, that that narrow approach is the position that is being and will 
continue to be pressed by those defending judicial review proceedings in cases 
concerning public procurement.  Some ammunition is available in the wording of Arden 
L.J.’s judgment in Chandler, where she said68 that the court inclined to be the view that 
a person other than an economic operator, with a sufficient interest, could bring judicial 
review proceedings to secure compliance with public procurement law.  He or she might 
have such an interest if he or she could show that such compliance “might have led to a 
different outcome that would have had a direct impact on him”.   The court could also 
envisage cases “where the gravity of a departure from public law obligations may justify 
the grant of a public law remedy in any event”.  It is submitted that this twin formulation 
seems focused on either end (“direct impact on the individual”:  “grave cases”) of what 
is properly, as made clear in the opinions in AXA and Walton, to be regarded as a 
spectrum. In particular, the general case law on standing recognises that there may well 
be cases where a person or body that is not personally or directly affected is accorded 
standing as a matter of the public interest.69 In these cases, while the seriousness of the 
infringement of public law can be relevant to standing, along with other factors,70 it is 
not suggested that standing based on the public interest is confined to cases where it 
can be shown that there has been a “grave” departure from public law obligations. 
 
7. The reception of Chandler  
How has Chandler been interpreted and applied in subsequent cases?  In R (on the 
application of UNISON) v NHS Wiltshire Primary Care Trust,71 Eady J. held, as a 
preliminary issue, that UNISON did not have standing to challenge the decisions of ten 
PCTs in the South West of England to enter contracts with NHS Shared Business Services 
                                         
68 [2009] EWCA Civ 1011, para.[77]. 
69 See De Smith, op. cit. n.10, paras 2-032, 2-036.  
70 See above n.11. 
71 [2012] EWHC 624 (Admin).  See comments by P. Henty, [2012] P.P.L.R. NA203.  See 
also Re Traffic Signs and Equipment Ltd [2012] NICA 18 (applying the “direct impact” 
test from Chandler). 
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Ltd72 that involved the out-sourcing of Family Health Services.  The challenge would 
have been that the defendants were at some point in breach of the Public Contracts 
Regulations 2006.  Counsel for the defendant argued that Chandler was simply wrong 
and that such a breach as was alleged here should not sound in public law at all.73  
However, Eady J. held74 that that had to be an argument for another day.  Counsel was 
successful in arguing, in the alternative, that UNISON lacked standing on the test 
propounded by Arden L.J. in Chandler.75  It could not be established that the decisions 
might have had a direct impact on UNISON members76 or that there had been a “grave” 
departure from public law obligations (this being a “high threshold”).   Eady J. 
emphasised his decision was made “very much in the specific context of the 2006 
regulations”.  He was not prepared to go so far as to apply the terminology used in 
Dixon77 and hold that the claimant was a “busybody”:  that would be “inappropriate and 
                                         
72 NHS SBS is a “unique joint venture between the Department of Health and Sopra 
Steria”:  www.sbs.nhs.uk/. 
73 He said it was unfortunate that the Court of Appeal in Chandler had not addressed two 
relevant cases:  R v Brent LBC, ex p O’Malley (1997) 30 H.L.R. 328, 355–356 
(Schiemann L.J.) and 373-374 (CA), and Risk Management Partners v Brent LBC [2010] 
L.G.R. 99 at [250]. In O’Malley Schiemann L.J. left open but thought to be of “some 
merit” an argument that, even if there had been a breach of the Public Works Contracts 
Regulations 1991 (SI 1991/2680), then, by virtue of reg.31(7), once the contract had 
been concluded, only damages could be awarded; this meant that non-compliance with 
the regulations in itself could not render the contract void. Schiemann L.J. noted that the 
applicants had tried to get round this by alleging a failure to consider the regulations or 
the possibility of compensation claims, but those allegations failed on the facts. The 
Court of Appeal agreed (at p.374) that “in view of the terms of reg.31, and the conduct 
of the council already noted in this context, judicial review would not have been an 
appropriate remedy.” At p.373 the court also noted that “in any event no claims have 
been made by anyone with an interest in carrying out the works”; it is not clear what 
significance it attached to that point. Para.[250] of Risk Management Partners (in the 
judgment of Moore-Bick L.J.) concerns the issue of delay, although it does include the 
proposition that a claim under the regulations is “an action to vindicate private rights”. It 
is submitted that it is difficult to see that these cases add anything of substance to the 
full argument vigorously deployed by the Secretary of State in Chandler that non-
compliance with the procurement regime was a matter of private law, which argument 
the court explicitly rejected.   
74 [2012] EWHC 624 (Admin), para.[6].  His Lordship did not explain why.  It may have 
been on the basis of the clear (albeit obiter) Court of Appeal authority in Chandler and 
uncertainties as to whether that decision could be challenged successfully as per 
incuriam.  It may be because UNISON lacked standing anyway:  see below. 
75 Ibid. paras [7]–[16]. 
76 It was not known what might have happened if the Regulations had been applied; 
there were no known candidates who could have expected to bid; “contemplation of any 
such hypothetical scenario is bound to be speculative”:  para.[12]. 
77 See above n.10. 
17 
 
unnecessarily offensive”.  There might have been analogy with Chandler in the sense 
that it might have been said that UNISON was not primarily concerned to promote open 
competition but “rather to put a spoke in the process of outsourcing to SBS”.  This was 
not, however, a necessary element in the reasoning process for disposing of the case.78  
The claim was also rejected on the grounds of delay. 
 
Eady J.’s approach to standing does suggest that a narrower approach is appropriate in 
the context of public procurement than generally in judicial review, given the distancing 
from Sedley J.’s judgment in the planning context in Dixon.  It is submitted that this 
would be unfortunate, given that the general point that issues concerning standing can 
only properly be judged in the light of the facts of the case and the specific arguments 
presented would seem as applicable in public procurement cases as elsewhere.  The fact 
that the regulations do establish a special civil regime under which economic operators 
can bring challenges on specified grounds is not in itself sufficient to justify a narrow 
approach to judicial review standing in all procurement cases.  However, it is not clear 
whether the answer in UNISON would have been different had a broader, more 
orthodox, approach to standing been adopted.  Eady J.’s reluctance to characterise 
UNISON as a “mere busybody” suggests that it might. It may be that he was simply 
being polite.  It has, furthermore, been noted79 that UNISON had been consulted and 
had made representations, considerations which are generally accepted to be pointers in 
favour of standing.80  
 
It is interesting to compare the approach of Eady J. in the UNISON case with that of 
Cranston J. in R (on the application of (1) National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport 
Workers, (2) Transport Salaried’ Staffs’ Association and (3) Associated Society of 
                                         
78 [2012] EWHC 624 (Admin) at para.[15]. 
79 P. Henty, [2012] P.P.L.R. NA 203, NA 207. 
80 R (on the application of the Law Society) v Legal Services Commission [2007] EWHC 
1848. Cf the point that participation in a local inquiry will help establish that a person is 
“aggrieved” for purposes of statutory application :  see Walton, above n.51. 
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Locomotive Engineers and Firemen) v Secretary of State for Transport81 in dismissing 
(on the ground of delay) a renewed application by the rail unions for permission to apply 
for judicial review of a decision to award rather than tender a short extension to an 
existing rail franchise.  In his Lordship’s view the comments in Chandler 
 
“about ideological claims have no purchase in this context.  The claimants’ policy may be 
the replacement of competitive tendering with nationalisation of the railways, but that 
does not detract from the sufficient interest which they have in these matters.  I am 
persuaded by Mr Cash’s witness statements that the claimants are arguably within the 
class of persons with a genuine interest and expertise in ensuring the Secretary of 
State’s compliance with the regime laid down in Regulation (EC) 1370/2007.”82 
 
It is submitted that this approach, in simply asking whether there was a “sufficient 
interest” and (echoing one aspect of Walton) taking account of the expertise of the 
claimants, is to be preferred.  It is also welcome that evidence of an ideological objection 
to privatisation is not to be taken as a bar to standing for a claim that a project should 
have been tendered.  In any case where it is arguable that a claim for judicial review is 
justified to protect the public interest, it is not obvious that even a dominant motive on 
the part of the particular claimant to obstruct a project opposed on political grounds 
should prevent a claimant being accorded standing. 
 
It is also welcome that Warby J. in R (on the application of O) v Secretary of State for 
International Development83 held that what was seen the narrower approach adopted in 
UNISON, based on dicta in Chandler, did not provide authoritative guidance in a different 
context.  Here the question was whether an Ethiopian citizen who claimed to have been 
a victim of human rights abuses in the course of an Ethiopian government programme 
                                         
81 [2014] EWHC 3030 (Admin). 
82 [2014] EWHC 3030 (Admin), para.[22].  Art 5(5) of Reg. (EC) 1370/2007, on public 
passenger transport services by rail and road, enables a direct award to be made as an 
emergency measure. 
83 [2014] EWHC 2371 (QB). 
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had standing to challenge the conduct of the Secretary of State in connection with the 
grant of development assistance to Ethiopia.  It would be contended that the programme 
had been at least indirectly funded via development assistance money from the UK.  The 
“impact or prospective impact on the claimant and his family could be described as 
indirect but it is not remote”.  That was enough to satisfy the requirement of a sufficient 
interest. 
 
8. Other developments in judicial review 
The adoption in a particular context of a narrower approach to standing also seems odd 
in the light of the steps (some highly controversial) the Coalition Government has taken 
to deter people from applying for judicial review.84  The stated purpose of these changes 
has been to prevent “abuses” that “act as a brake on growth”.85  Among the changes 
have been:  the shortening of time limits in planning and procurement cases;86  an 
increase in fees and introduction of a new fee for oral renewal of a permission hearing;87 
removal of the right to a reconsideration at a hearing of the application for permission to 
bring judicial review (an oral renewal) in any case where the application is certified as 
totally without merit by the judge considering the application on the papers;88 the 
establishment of a new Planning Court within the Queen’s Bench Division of the High 
Court;89  financial reforms, “the aim being to deter claimants from bringing or persisting 
with weak cases”;90  a lower threshold test for when a defect in procedure would have 
                                         
84 See Ministry of Justice, Judicial Review; proposals for reform (Consultation Paper CP 
25/2012, December 2012); Ministry of Justice: Reform of Judicial Review: the 
Government response (April 2013); Ministry of Justice, Judicial Review Proposal for 
Further Reform(Cm 8703, September 2013); Ministry of Justice, Judicial review – 
proposals for further reform: the Government response (February 2014). 
85 Chris Grayling, Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Ministerial Foreword 
to the February 2014 document. 
86 See now C.P.R. Rule 54.5(4)–(6), inserted by SI 2013/1412 r.4(a)(iii). 
87 See the Civil Proceedings Fees (Amendment) Order 2014 (SI 2014/874).  
88 See now C.P.R. 54.12 (7), inserted by SI 2013/1412 r. 4 (b) (ii). 
89 See C.P.R. Rule 54.21 – 54.24, inserted by SI 2014/610, r. 3 and amended by SI 
2014/1233 r. 4. 
90 See the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, ss 85-90.  Applicants will be required to 
disclose information about the financing of the application; the court must have regard 
to this information when determining by whom and to what extent costs of or incidental 
to judicial review proceedings are to be paid, and will be able to order costs to be paid 
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made no difference to the original outcome;91  and broadening provision for “leapfrog” 
appeals directly to the Supreme Court from the High Court and the Upper Tribunal.92  At 
the same time, the Supreme Court in Walton affirmed, and indeed extended, recognition 
of the discretion to refuse a remedy.  It is of particular interest that, in the light of the 
changes it was introducing (and in fact the overwhelming hostility of respondents to 
consultation on the point),93  the Government, although “clear that the current 
approach… allows for misuse”, did not take forward its proposal that the test for standing 
for judicial review be changed to one requiring a direct interest.94  If the Government is 




There are overwhelming indications, including from the decision in Walton, that the 
general test for standing for judicial review remains broad and liberal.  The reference to 
“direct affect” in AXA, read in the light of the comments in Walton, are not to be taken 
as requiring generally a person not “directly affected” to be able to show that there has 
been a “grave” breach of public law principles.  Something like this position appears to 
have been adopted in the procurement context by Arden L.J. in Chandler.  However, it is 
submitted that it is undesirable in principle for public procurement decisions to be 
                                                                                                                               
by a person, other than a party to proceedings, who is providing financial support.  
Interveners will only be awarded costs in exceptional circumstances.  In specified 
circumstances costs generated for others by their intervention will be awarded against 
interveners.  The making of costs applying orders will be restricted. 
91 See the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 s.84, which will amend the Senior Courts 
Act 1981 s.31 to provide that the High Court must refuse to grant relief or leave “if it 
appears to the court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not 
have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred.  This 
may be disapplied if it considers that it is appropriate to do so for reasons of exceptional 
public interest.  The same will apply to the Upper Tribunal.   
92 See the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 ss 63, 64. 
93 Among the reasons given for opposing the change were that claims brought by groups 
or organisations without a direct interest should continue to be possible (there were 
relatively few such claims and these tended to be more successful than on average); the 
changes would impact on meritorious claims and would move the focus from challenging 
public wrong to protecting private rights; there would be litigation costs.  See also 
comments by one of the respondents, J. McGarry, [2014] J.R. 60. 
94 See the February 2014 document (n.84), pp 7, 10 – 11, 26 – 28. 
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regarded as a special enclave within which a narrow test for standing, narrower than 
that generally applicable in judicial review, is to be applied.  It is not obvious that that 
was intended by Arden L.J. in Chandler, but that does now seem to be how it is being 
interpreted by some.95  Given that it is only in relatively exceptional circumstances that 
public procurement decisions are in any event amenable to judicial review,96 it is odd 
that a decision which would otherwise be quashed as unlawful can remain in place simply 
because an artificially narrow approach is taken to the question of standing.  It is all the 
odder for this to happen at a time when the Government is making it more and more 
difficult in other ways to claim for judicial review to be brought and the courts are 
emphasising the width of the general discretion to refuse relief. 
 
A final thought is this.  Are there to be other subject areas within the scope of public law 
where it will be argued that a narrower–than–normal approach to standing should be 
adopted?  It is submitted that developments whereby the rules of judicial review (as 
distinct from the application of the normal rules) would differ from area to area would 
add complexity to the law, necessitating unhelpful litigation on where the boundaries 
between these different areas should be drawn.  Such developments should be firmly 
restricted. In Gottlieb, Lang J. simply asked and answered the question whether the 
















                                         
95 Compare UNISON on the one hand with R (on the application of O) v Secretary of 
State for International Development, above.   
96 See Chandler. 
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